Broke, Ill, and Obese: The Effect of Household Debt on Health by Matthias Keese & Hendrik Schmitz
RUHR
ECONOMIC PAPERS
Broke, Ill, and Obese:




Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 2283 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #234 
Responsible Editor: Volker Clausen
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2010
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-268-2
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #234
Matthias Keese and Hendrik Schmitz
Broke, Ill, and Obese:
The Eﬀ  ect of Household Debt on HealthBibliograﬁ  sche Informationen 
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen National-
bibliograﬁ  e; detaillierte bibliograﬁ  sche Daten sind im Internet über: 
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufb  ar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-268-2Matthias Keese and Hendrik Schmitz1
Broke, Ill, and Obese: The Eﬀ  ect of 
Household Debt on Health
Abstract
We analyze the eﬀ  ect of household indebtedness on diﬀ  erent health outcomes using 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1999–2009. To establish a causal 
eﬀ  ect, we rely on (a) ﬁ  xed-eﬀ  ects methods, (b) a subsample of constantly employed 
individuals, and (c) lagged debt variables to rule out problems of reverse causality. We 
apply diﬀ  erent measures of household indebtedness, such as the percentage shares 
of household income spent on consumer credit and home loan repayments (which 
indicate the severity of household indebtedness) and a binary variable of relative 
overindebtedness (which indicates a precarious debt situation). We ﬁ   nd all debt 
measures to be strongly correlated with health satisfaction, mental health, and obesity. 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and reversed causality we ﬁ  nd evidence that 
household debt also causally deteriorates physical and mental health. However, there is 
no causal eﬀ  ect on being obese.
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Household indebtedness has notably risen in the last years. In 1993, the volume of out-
standing loans of banks to private households in Germany amounted to about 390 billion
euros. In 1995 it exceeded 600 billion for the ﬁrst time, and since 2005 it has always been
more than 1,000 billion euro with about 80 percent falling upon home loans.1 From 1998
to 2008, average consumer debt has risen from 1,300 to 1,700 euros per household. At
the same time, the average mortgage debt has increased from 18,600 to 24,500 euros per
household (Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).
Without question, the possibility to take out a loan and to incur debt is usually
welfare enhancing for the household since it enables consumption smoothing over time.
However, it may also be harmful if individuals involuntarily run into ﬁnancial distress
or overindebtedness. This may be the case if individuals underestimate the ﬁnancial
burden of repaying debt in the future or if unexpected shocks like job loss or disability
cause repayment arrears. Indeed, overindebtedness of private households has become a
widespread phenomenon. In Germany, for instance, 2.8 million households (7.1 percent of
all households) were overindebted in 2007 (Zimmermann, 2008). Indeed, the upgrowth of
private indebtedness has slown down since its peak in 2006 but the recent credit crunch
and the successive economic crisis might increase the number of households facing severe
debt-related ﬁnancial diﬃculties.
Apart from other problems that come along with debt-related ﬁnancial problems (e.g.,
the intertemporal misallocation of ﬁnancial resources and private insolvency), debt might
aﬀect the health status for several reasons. First, it may provoke stress and foster mental
distress, especially if households are confronted with high repayments. This permanent
distress may cause psychosomatic conditions and, consequently, may worsen the physical
health status as well. Second, high repayment burdens tighten the ﬁnancial situation.
Thus, individuals may save on costly medical care utilization and health protection like,
e.g., healthy food that is often seen to be more expensive than junk food.
Analyzing the eﬀect of household debt on health is important for several reasons. If
debt has adverse health eﬀects, this will require stronger eﬀort of policy makers to prevent
households from entering a precarious debt situation. This will be particularly important
if people run into a poverty trap, i.e., if deteriorated health (due to indebtedness) induces
job loss which results in even higher relative debt burdens. Moreover, only the precise
knowledge of which health aspect is aﬀected by debt problems allows to react in an
appropriate manner – i.e., adverse eﬀects on mental health call for diﬀerent solutions
than obesity caused by debt burdens. While one solution to the ﬁrst problem would be
to strengthen debt counselling and to improve ﬁnancial literacy, especially debt literacy
1The loan ﬁgures are taken from time series data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank
(http://www.bundesbank.de).
4(Lusardi and Tufano, 2009), some authors suggest to increase the availability of healthy
food by low-pricing campaigns to react to obesity caused by debt problems (Münster et
al., 2009).
Another reason to analyze the eﬀects of debt on health is to learn more about the
socioeconomic gradient in health. The literature consistently ﬁnds that, around the world,
poorer households are in worse health but it is diﬃcult to show that income is the reason
for this (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2003; Cutler et al., 2006). Debt-related ﬁnancial distress
(usually correlated with low income) could be a pathway to deteriorated health and,
therefore, add to the explanation of the income gradient in health.
There is strong support in the literature for a correlation between debt burdens and
both bad physical and mental health, see e.g., Marmot et al. (1997), Kempson (2002),
Brown et al. (2005), or Duygan-Bump and Grant (2009). However, up to now, it is
not entirely clear if debt problems are also causal for health problems. In our analysis,
we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1999-2009
and go beyond the existing literature that mostly provides a descriptive picture of the
relationship between debt and health. There are several econometric challenges in ﬁnding
causal eﬀects of indebtedness on health. First, unobservable factors may coincide with
ﬁnancial problems and bad health. To rule out omitted variable bias due to unobserved
heterogeneity we exploit the panel-nature of our data and use ﬁxed-eﬀects methods.
Second, we also address potential problems arising from reverse causality. Since the
German health insurance system covers basically all medical expenses we can exclude a
direct eﬀect of health on debt due to high medical bills. However, individuals may become
unemployed or be forced to leave the labor market due to an adverse health shock and,
consequently, get into trouble repaying their debt. We deal with this indirect eﬀect of
health on debt problems by looking at a subsample of constantly employed individuals,
thus excluding individuals that might have stopped working due to bad health. Moreover,
we control for changes in household composition that are due to divorce, separation, or
death of the partner. These events might have own eﬀects on health and the ﬁnancial situ-
ation. Lastly, we rely on lagged debt variables to ensure that starting the debt repayment
was prior to the observed health outcome so that the eﬀect we seek to identify does indeed
go from debt to health and not viceversa. In our approach we do not rely on untestable
exclusion restrictions as do most of the previous studies based on instrumental-variable
techniques. Therefore, we use arguably weaker identifying assumptions to establish a
causal eﬀect.
Our dependent variables are three diﬀerent health measures: overall health satisfac-
tion, mental health, and being obese. Our main explanatory variables are three diﬀerent
measures of household indebtedness: consumer debt and housing loan repayments as a
share of household income as well as a binary variable for being overindebted. We ﬁnd a
5negative correlation between household debt and health. On average, indebted individu-
als report to be less satisﬁed with their health status, have worse mental health, and are
more likely to be obese. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality,
we ﬁnd that household debt does indeed worsen health satisfaction and mental health. In
contrast, the likelihood of being obese is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by debt. Our results
largely hold for all three debt measures. Thereby, repayments for home loans and for
consumer debt exhibit broadly similar eﬀects on health.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the second section, we provide an overview of
the empirical literature on debt and health. The third section presents the data and
econometric methods. Estimation results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents
some robustness checks while Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is a vast literature on the relation between health and socio-economic status (SES),
virtually always ﬁnding an income gradient in health, both within and between countries.
However, the causal eﬀect of income on health as well as potential reasons for the gradient
are debated and diﬃcult to show (see e.g., Adams et al., 2003; Cutler et al., 2006).
As an indirect eﬀect of a life event that frequently coincides with a precarious ﬁ-
nancial situation, one strand of the literature analyzes the eﬀects of unemployment on
health. Because authors usually control for the income drop due to job loss, the eﬀect
of unemployment on health also captures non-monetary impacts, especially in countries
with fairly generous unemployment insurance systems such as Germany. Job loss can be
seen as a pathway for the socio-economic gradient if income per se is not causal for bad
health but life events such as unemployment (usually correlated with low income) are.
The evidence on the eﬀect of unemployment on health, however, is mixed.2
Only a few contributions deal explicitly with issues concerning household indebted-
ness and health. Moreover, the causal relation between health and debt remains still
unclear. Brown et al. (2005) estimate an ordered probit model with a GHQ12 score as
the dependent variable that captures the answers to diﬀerent questions on psychological
well-being. They show that psychological distress is higher among household heads with
a higher amount of outstanding non-mortgage debt using the British Household Panel
Survey. In contrast, they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects for mortgage debt. However, they do
not estimate a panel model and "cannot ﬁrmly establish that our parameter estimates
2See, e.g., Browning et al. (2006), Salm (2009), Kuhn and Lalive (2009), Eliason and Storrie (2009),
Sullivan and Wachter (2009) for recent international studies as well as Schmitz (2010) for a recent study
using German data.
6are the causal eﬀects" (p. 657).
Using data from the British Families’ and Children’ Survey (FACS), Lenton and
Mosley (2008) ﬁnd an impact of being indebted on both physical and mental health.
With the same dataset, Bridges and Disney (2010) ﬁnd a link between perceived debt
problems and self-assessed depression of mothers. Both studies account for the possible
interaction between debt and health by estimating simultaneous-equation models that
require strong exclusion restrictions. For instance, Bridges and Disney (2010) assume
that debt directly aﬀects the mental health status but not vice versa. Duygan-Bump and
Grant (2009) use the European Community Household Panel. Their analysis of diﬀerent
European countries yields the ﬁnding that arrears are often followed by adverse health
shocks. Drentea (2000) and Drentea and Lavrakas (2000) ﬁnd associations between credit
card debt and health problems, namely anxiety (the former study) as well as diﬀerent
subjective and objective health measures (the latter one). However, both studies are only
cross-sectional and use representative but rather small samples of adults in the US state
of Ohio. Webley and Nyhus (2001) focus on the economic and psychological determinants
of consumer debt. Their results from dynamic analyses of Dutch panel data indicate an
association between debt in previous periods and psychological outcomes in later periods.
The contribution of our paper is to provide a more comprehensive analysis than is done
in most of the mentioned studies. We use a large and representative household dataset,
combine objective and subjective measures of mental and physical health with objective
measures of household debt and use panel data techniques instead of IV approaches.
3 Data and empirical strategy
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1999 to 2009.
This dataset started in 1984 and surveyed more than 20,000 persons in about 11,000
households in the 2008 wave (Wagner et al., 2007).3 The questionnaire asks both on the
individual and on the household level. For instance, health-related variables are captured
on an individual base, while we obtain information on debt in the household questionnaire
only. The respective household characteristics (such as debt repayments, net household
income, and household composition) are assigned to each member of the household.
We base our analysis on adult individuals below the age of 65 since the elderly usually
do not take out loans in the same magnitude as working-age individuals do. At the same
3The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v3.0 (Jul 2008)
for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz
generated DO le to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006)
describe PanelWhiz in detail.
7time, they naturally face more health problems. In the regression analysis it is diﬃcult
to control for these non-linear eﬀects, i.e., for the spurious positive correlation between
debt and health. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the active population.
We apply three diﬀerent measures of relative indebtedness. They do not reﬂect debt
stocks, but debt repayments. We argue that the impact of a debt burden on personal
stress is reﬂected by the relative burden it puts on the household budget. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that the share of household income dedicated to debt repayments constitutes an
adequate measure of a household’s debt intensity. Consequently, the ﬁrst debt measure we
apply is the ratio of consumer credit repayments and household net income. The higher
this measure, the higher is the relative debt burden the household faces. The second
measure is the ratio of home loan repayments and household income. We include both
ratios in one regression to check whether diﬀerent debt types (secured housing debt vs.
presumably unsecured consumer debt) exhibit diﬀerent eﬀects on health.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Indebtedness trend over time
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Consumer debt/Income 3.9 3.7 3.7 2.5 2.4 2.5
(all HH)
Housing debt/Income 5.5 5.8 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.1
(all HH)
Consumer debt/Income 13.3 12.6 12.8 11.2 10.5 10.6
(HH with consumer debt)
Housing debt/Income 20.0 19.8 19.9 20.4 20.0 19.4
(HH with home loans)
HH has consumer debt 29.1 29.2 29.1 22.3 22.8 23.6
HH has housing debt 27.8 29.7 32.9 32.6 32.8 31.7
Overindebted HH 7.6 6.2 5.6 5.5 5.1 4.3
Observations 11,533 17,570 17,406 15,975 15,112 14,536
Note. All ﬁgures are in percent. Consumer debt/Income: ratio of debt repayments (consumer credit) and household net
income. Housing debt/Income: ratio of debt repayments (home loans) and household net income. HH with a debt ratio
larger than 0.7 excluded. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Own calculations.
However, while small relative debt burdens may not come along with high stress levels,
a precarious ﬁnancial situation may have a strong impact on personal well-being. Thus,
a third debt measure is a binary variable indicating whether a household is overindebted
(Zimmermann, 2007). A household will be considered overindebted if its net income after
debt repayments (for home loans and consumer credit) falls below the social assistance
level (and if the household is indeed indebted). Thereby, the potential social assistance
a household would obtain constitutes the socially accepted subsistence level. Since the
8social assistance level takes household size and composition into account, it also serves as
an equalizing factor to improve the comparability of debt burdens and income between
diﬀerent household types. Social legislation changed several times in the last years. To
ensure comparability over the entire observation period, we calculate the potential social
assistance level for 2009 and deﬂate the computed amounts to earlier periods.
After excluding observations with unreasonably high debt ratios (more than 0.7), we
use information from 32,132 individuals with 176,468 observations in person-year form.
Table 1 illustrates the development of household debt in our sample over time. The
average ratio of debt repayments for consumer credit and income ranges between two and
four percent. For home loans, the mean ratio amounts to 5.5 to 6.5 percent. However,
conditional on having a certain debt type, the mean values are notably higher: up to
13.3 (consumer debt) and 20.4 percent (housing debt), respectively. Between 22 and
29 percent of the sample live in households with consumer credit, up to 33 percent in
households with home loans. The time trends of the two debt types show a somewhat
diﬀerent evolution. Consumer indebtedness peaked around the turn of the millennium.
As for housing debt, the ﬁgures are relatively stable since the peak around 2003. The
share of individuals living in overindebted households has decreased over the observation
period. Nevertheless, about four to ﬁve percent of the sample lives in an overindebted
household. However, these sample descriptions are possibly inﬂuenced by diﬀerent factors.
First, there was a major SOEP refreshment in the 2000 wave. Since then, we observe a
slightly aging panel. Second, we focus on debt repayments. The evolution of debt stocks
may have exhibited a diﬀerent path.
The debt measures are only available at the household level. Moreover, the SOEP
does not ask for the liability of the debt. Thus, we cannot identify the debitor within the
household. Therefore, we attain the same debt measures to all adults in a household. We
argue that this procedure is justiﬁed because a household’s debt repayment is perceptible
to all household members (e.g., due to consumption reductions of all members). At the
same time, all household members may derive utility from the durable and non-durable
goods ﬁnanced by credits. Moreover, cohabiting couples are likely to conclude their loan
agreements jointly. Therefore, if debt burdens have an impact on health, these eﬀects
should be detectable for all household members.4
As regards the health status, we employ three diﬀerent measures. (1) The satisfaction
with health, a self-stated measure on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (totally happy) to
10 (totally unhappy). (2) A mental health score between 0 and 100 (with higher values
implying a worse mental health) which is calculated based on the SF12v2-questionnaire
4When we consider household heads only, we roughly lose half of the observations. However, the
regression results for this subsample are similar to the results with the full sample. We discuss this and
other robustness checks in detail in the ﬁfth section.
9in the SOEP5, and (3) a binary indicator for obesity, deﬁned as a body mass index of
more than 30. Health satisfaction is widely used in the literature to proxy the health
status, e.g. by Frijters et al. (2005), Jones and Schurer (2010), or Schmitz (2010). It
is subjective but it might be the preferred measure when we think of health in terms of
the utility derived from it. While health satisfaction is asked in each of the years, the
mental health score and the body mass index are only available biennially between 2002
and 2008. Therefore, the number of observations is smaller in these regressions using the
latter two measures.
Table 2 reports means of the three health measures. According to all health measures,
those who have to repay consumer debt and those who live in overindebted households
are in worse health. This holds in particular for overindebted households. In contrast,
households with home loans are even in better health compared to the entire sample. The
average health satisfaction is slightly better (3.0 vs. 3.1 percent, respectively), the mental
health scores are similar (50.0 and 50.1, respectively), and the probability of being obese
is smaller (13.4 and 14.3 percent, respectively). This reﬂects the fact that those who are
in better health and in a better ﬁnancial situation are also more likely to actually get a
home loan.
Table 2. Sample means of health measures
Full HH with HH with Overin- Observations
sample consumer debt home loans debted HH full sample
Health satisfaction 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.3 176,468
MCS 50.1 51.1 50.0 52.2 63,849
Obesity in % 14.3 16.4 13.4 17.8 65,350
Note. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. MCS = Mental health score. Higher values = worse health. Own calculations.
Obviously, Table 2 does not tell anything about a causal eﬀect of debt on health. Several
reasons may lead to the correlation. First, observable and unobservable third factors
might both aﬀect bad health and debt. Unobservable factors could be, for instance, time
preferences or risk aversion. Risk loving individuals might have a higher propensity to
take out a loan. At the same time, they might care less for preventive health behavior (like
5The SF12v2-questionnaire includes several questions about health quality and health satisfaction
of individuals. The exact questions which include questions about phases of melancholy, emotional
problems or social limitations due to mental health problems are given in Table A1 in the appendix.
The Mental Component Summary Scale is provided by the SOEP-group and calculated using explorative
factor analysis. It ranges from 0 to 100, with – originally – a higher value indicating a better health
status. We recoded it in this paper. The mean value of the SOEP 2004 population is 50 points with a
standard deviation of 10 points (see Andersen et al., 2007, for a description).
10medical check-ups or non-smoking). Although we are able to include a rich set of covariates
and, thus, control for a great deal of observable heterogeneity between ﬁnancially sound
and indebted households, these unobserved factors are likely to lead to biased estimates
of the eﬀect of debt on health. One solution to this endogeneity problem could be an
instrumental variable approach. However, in practice, it is very hard to ﬁnd convincing
(that is, strong and valid) instruments. Here, we exploit the fact that we have a panel.
In addition to benchmark estimations that use ordinary least squares (OLS), we control
for the unobserved heterogeneity by using ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation methods. Thereby,
we assume that the unobserved eﬀects like risk aversion or time preferences are time-
constant. We argue that the assumption of these personality traits being invariant over a
short period of time is much less restrictive than the (also) non-testable assumptions of
valid instruments.
A second potential reason for the observed correlation is that bad health might cause
debt problems. If this is the case, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates will turn out to be biased and
we overestimate possible negative health eﬀects of debt. Reverse causality could result
from several sources. Bad health increases the demand for health services. In principle,
this could cause high bills for hospital treatments or expensive drugs with the need to
take out a loan to pay for them. Yet, this is not a problem at all in Germany, where
basically every individual has comprehensive health insurance coverage that pays for all
treatments and drugs, except for fairly small copayments. However, bad health reduces
the productivity, hence the ability to generate income. For instance, Arrow (1996) and
Riphahn (1999) show that bad health increases the risk of job loss. Unemployment,
in turn, is often seen as a trigger of overindebtedness. Indeed, Keese (2009) ﬁnds that
unemployment increases the risk of overindebtedness in Germany. To take this potential
problem into account we use, in one speciﬁcation, a subsample of individuals who have
been working constantly between 1999 and 2009. That is, we disregard all individuals
who where unemployed or out of the labor force at least once in the observation period
and might subsequently have problems to repay debt. By doing this, we exclude all those
who possibly lost their job or left the labor market due to health problems.
Table 3 compares the subsamples of individuals who never changed their employment
status between 1999 and 2009 and of individuals who did so at least once. Average health
satisfaction is worse in the latter group (2.9 vs. 3.3 percent). These people do also have a
worse mental health score and they are more likely to be obese. Thus, the working group
is healthier. The group of constantly working individuals also has, on average, higher debt
repayments (consumer debt: 3.5 vs. 3.0 percent; home loans: 7.4 vs. 5.3 percent). This
is due to a higher likelihood of being indebted and points to the fact that these people are
more likely to actually get a credit when they demand one. Conditional on having debt
repayments, the shares of debt repayments to income are very similar in both groups.
11Overindebtedness, however, is much less common among those constantly participating
in the labor market.
We include a wide range of control variables in our regressions, such as age, the
presence of children in the household, education, employment status, health insurance
status (public or private health insurance) and we distinguish between West and East
Germany. In addition, we include the net equivalent household income and an indicator
of being homeowner to control for eﬀects of income and wealth (possibly correlated with
having debt) on health. Importantly, we control for the marital status. The death of
the partner, separation, or divorce are likely to have an impact on the health status.
In addition, loss of the breadwinner, household split-up, or funeral costs may increase
debt burdens. We therefore include dummy variables for being widowed or divorced in
the regression to rule out that these life events aﬀect our results. Sample means of all
covariates are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for subgroups
Always Not always
employed employed
Consumer debt/Income (all HH) in % 3.5 3.0
Housing debt/Income (all HH) in % 7.4 5.3
HH has consumer debt in % 28.9 24.4
HH has housing debt in % 36.8 26.8
Consumer debt/Income (HH with consumer debt) in % 12.0 12.2
Housing debt/Income (HH with home loans) in % 20.2 19.7
Overindebted HH in % 4.0 6.7
Health Satisfaction 2.9 3.3
MCS 49.5 50.7
Obese in % 13.7 14.7
Observations 78,000 98,468
Note. Source: Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. MCS = Mental health score. Higher values = worse health.
Using the subsample of constantly employed individuals rules out the possibility that
ill individuals lose their job and run into ﬁnancial trouble afterwards. However, it does not
account for the potential problem that individuals have phases of melancholy or depression
and self-medicate it by increased shopping (followed by consumer debt). Although it is
debatable if the share of aﬀected individuals is large enough to bias the results, we use,
as a ﬁnal speciﬁcation, lagged debt variables, again with the entire sample. Together
12with the ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation this ensures that changes in debt predate changes in
health. Since the interpretation of the thus estimated parameters diﬀers somewhat from
the original ones (it can be interpreted as a medium-term eﬀect of past debt on health)
this should primarily be seen as a robustness check.
4 Estimation results
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimated eﬀects for the three health measures and the diﬀerent
debt measures. As a benchmark, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress all health
measures on the two debt ratios and the overindebtedness indicator, respectively.6 These
results are displayed in column (1) in the tables. For the sake of brevity we only report
the coeﬃcients of the debt variables. Full estimation results are presented in Tables A2
to A7 in the appendix.
The OLS regressions show that even after controlling for a large set of covariates,
indebted individuals are in worse health, according to all debt and health measures. As
displayed in column (1) in Table 4, an increase in the debt-repayment-to-income ratio
(consumer credit) by 10 percentage points is associated with a higher expected value
of health satisfaction of 0.1692 (note again that this means worse health satisfaction).
Interestingly, the unconditionally positive association between health and home loans
(Table 2) turns into a negative relationship once we condition on observable variable (like
household income). The respective eﬀect is about 0.05. Being overindebted (Table 5) is
associated with a 0.202 higher value of the health satisfaction variable. The same holds
for mental health and obesity. The higher the debt burden, the worse is the mental health
status and the more frequent is obesity. The latter relationship, however, only holds for
consumer debt.
Due to potential endogeneity problems as discussed above, these benchmark results
should not be interpreted as causal impacts of debt on health. Column (2) show the
ﬁxed-eﬀects results for debt repayment (Table 4) and overindebtedness (Table 5). As
expected, the sizes of the coeﬃcients diminish notably in most speciﬁcations. Apparently,
unobservable eﬀects that both inﬂuence health and debt problems play an important
role in explaining the correlation between debt and health. Still, the eﬀects are highly
signiﬁcant in the health satisfaction and the mental health regression. For instance, being
overindebted is associated with an increase of 0.057 of the health satisfaction variable
and reduces the mental health score by 0.673. This is about one thirteenth of a standard
6Although health satisfaction is an ordered variable we use linear models instead of ordered models
for simplicity. Note that Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) report that there is little diﬀerence in the
resulting eﬀects between linear ﬁxed-eﬀects models and their ﬁxed-eﬀects ordered logit.
13deviation of the mental health score, thus both eﬀects are rather moderate. Nevertheless,
they are highly signiﬁcant. Again, the direction of the eﬀect of debt on health is the
same for consumer credit and home loans. While the strength of the impact on health
satisfaction is similar for both debt types, home loans do aﬀect the mental health status
somewhat stronger.
Table 4. Regression results: Debt repayments
Dependent Explanatory OLS FE FE FE
variable variables Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Consumer debt/ 1.692*** 0.290*** 0.216** 0.155**
satisfaction Income (0.117) (0.076) (0.103) (0.078)
Housing debt/ 0.534*** 0.218** 0.256** 0.160**
Income (0.109) (0.086) (0.110) (0.071)
MCS Consumer debt/ 7.406*** 1.607** 3.109*** 1.155
Income (0.823) (0.750) (0.988) (0.757)
Housing debt/ 2.357*** 2.487*** 3.168*** 1.490**
Income (0.645) (0.768) (0.987) (0.689)
Obese Consumer debt/ 0.148*** -0.003 0.012 -0.030*
Income (0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017)
Housing debt/ 0.018 0.004 0.004 0.007
Income (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Full estimation
results in Tables A2-A7 in the appendix.
Table 5. Regression results: Overindebtedness
Dependent Explanatory OLS FE FE FE
variable variables Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Overindebted 0.203*** 0.057** 0.037 0.018
satisfaction (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.023)
MCS Overindebted 0.972*** 0.673*** 0.615* 0.196
(0.264) (0.234) (0.350) (0.236)
Obese Overindebted 0.020*** -0.001 -0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Full estimation
results in Tables A2-A7 in the appendix.
14After controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, the likelihood of being obese is not signiﬁcantly af-
fected neither by the magnitude of debt repayments nor by being overindebted. Therefore,
the observation of a higher incidence of obesity in the group of overindebted households
is apparently not caused by the debt situation but by other factors.
Our ﬁndings remain stable when we restrict the sample to individuals who constantly
participated in the labor market. The ﬁxed-eﬀects results for this subgroup are reported
in column (3) in Tables 4 and 5. For both debt-repayment-to-income ratios, there is a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of health satisfaction and on the mental health score. In
all cases, the health status deteriorates in response to a tightened debt situation. Home
loan repayments are somewhat worse for mental health than consumer credit repayments.
Contrary to our expectations, the eﬀects of debt in the subsample of individuals without a
change in their employment status are stronger compared to the entire sample (for mental
health). As regards obesity, we get results similar to those for the entire sample. There
is no causal eﬀect of the household’s debt situation on the probability of being obese.
In contrast, the eﬀect of overindebtedness is weakly or not signiﬁcant in the restricted
sample.
Column (4) in Tables 4 and 5 presents results from ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations with
lagged debt variables (debt repayment and overindebtedness in t-1). As regards statis-
tical signiﬁcance, the eﬀects of debt on health are similar to our previous ﬁndings (with
two exceptions). Consumer debt and homeloan repayments have a negative impact on
health satisfaction. Furthermore, housing debt has adverse eﬀects on mental health while
consumer debt has not. The latter result could be explained by a reversed causality eﬀect
from mental health to consumer debt (due to the “shopping therapy”) which is less likely
in this speciﬁcation and only applies to consumer debt and not to housing loans. How-
ever, the estimated coeﬃcient of 1.155 is not zero but just insigniﬁcant. Unsurprisingly,
all eﬀects in this speciﬁcation are smaller since we measure contemporaneous eﬀects of
past indebtedness. In particular, lagged overindebtedness does not aﬀect the health mea-
sures signiﬁcantly. Altogether, these results provide evidence that the estimation results
in column (2) are not entirely driven by reversed causality.
To sum up, there is evidence for negative eﬀects of debt on health satisfaction and
mental health, but not on the likelihood of being obese. This suggests that debt and
overindebtedness cause health problems via mental distress and not via the need to reduce
the consumption of healthy food due to ﬁnancial constraints.
Interestingly, our results are similar for both debt measures, although they diﬀer in
some aspects. While the ratios of repayments and income weight a change in relative debt
repayments equally irrespective of whether the household is on a low or on an already
high debt level, the indicator for overindebtedness represents a change from a sound to a
precarious ﬁnancial situation. The health status responds to the debt burden, irrespective
15of whether it is secured (like mortgage debt) or unsecured (like consumer credit). For
mental health, we ﬁnd that housing debt has an even more severe impact. The reason
for this diﬀerence might be that secured debt induces higher stress because it implies the
loss of a property in case of consumer insolvency.
5 Robustness checks
We check for the robustness of our results by diﬀering the health variables and the sample
composition. The results of all robustness checks are not presented here but available upon
request. First, we use an indicator for overweight (BMI exceeding 25) and the body-mass
index as outcome variables instead of obesity. This does not aﬀect the results at all.
While overindebted individuals have a higher BMI and are more likely to be overweight,
ﬁxed-eﬀects results show that there is no causal eﬀect of debt on the body-mass index.
Second, we restrict the analysis to household heads only, instead of including all adult
household members. This would be the preferred speciﬁcation when assuming that house-
hold heads make ﬁnancial decisions of the household independently and are the only
household members that suﬀer from overindebtedness and ﬁnancial distress. The results
stay broadly the same. Hence, the adverse health eﬀects of debt hold for all household
members, irrespective of who the ﬁnancial decision-maker is and who legally owes the
debt burden.
Third, we take a closer look into the debt measures. A relative debt burden can
increase due to higher debt repayments or due to reductions in income. Similarly, a
household can become overindebted after a change in debt repayment, income, or subsis-
tence level. It could be argued that the three diﬀerent channels through which an increase
in relative indebtedness may occur have diﬀerent eﬀects on health. In our data set, in
most cases, an increase (or decrease) in relative indebtedness is mainly driven by changes
in the debt repayment and not by changes in income. Nevertheless, we repeat our anal-
ysis and exclude all observations for which income changes are the dominating factor for
changes in relative indebtedness. These are about eight per cent of all observations and
this sample restriction does not alter the results.
Finally, we test for another possible pathway of worse health due to debt problems. It
might be that indebted individuals forego doctor visits to save on the (albeit fairly low)
copayments. Therefore, we use the number of doctor visits within the last three months
prior to the interview as an outcome variable and also control for the health status of the
respondents. The results suggest that people in indebted households are actually more
likely to attend the doctor. Thus, the hypothesis of debt causing less doctor visits – and,
16thus, being one pathway for the worse health status of indebted individuals – due to the
ﬁnancial burden of copayments can be rejected.
6 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of household indebtedness on physical and mental health using a
large and representative panel dataset, the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years
1999-2009. We use several measures that display diﬀerent aspects of individual health,
namely health satisfaction, a mental health score, and an indicator of obesity. Our ex-
planatory variables of main interest are three measures of household debt: monthly debt
repayments for consumer credit as share of household income, home loan repayments as a
share of income, and a binary indicator of overindebtedness. We address several empirical
challenges resulting from the complex relation of debt and health, such as endogeneity
problems due to unobserved heterogeneity and potential reverse causality running from
health to debt. We do this by using ﬁxed-eﬀects methods, by including lagged debt vari-
ables, and by constructing a subsample unaﬀected by unemployment or a drop out of the
labor market in the entire observation period.
In accordance with the existing literature, we ﬁnd that indebted individuals are more
likely to be in bad health. This correlation holds for all three health measures. Our
results from ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions suggest that both health satisfaction and mental
health deteriorate with the debt burdens and, similarly, are negatively aﬀected in case
the household is overindebted. While we ﬁnd that obese individuals are more likely to be
indebted, we do not ﬁnd a causal eﬀect of debt on obesity. The results are qualitatively the
same for all debt measures indicating that unsecured debt (consumer credit) and secured
debt (home loans) impose a similar pressure on the respondents’ health status. As regards
the ratios of debt repayments and income, we come to similar conclusions when restricting
the sample to individuals participating in the labor market over the entire observation
period. Moreover, the lagged ratios of debt repayments and income have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on health (in contrast to the lagged indicator of relative overindebtedness), however, with
a weaker impact compared to the contemporaneous debt measures.
Our results add to the literature on the socio-economic gradient in health. While it is
diﬃcult to show that income is causal for the worse health status of poorer individuals,
indebtedness might be a pathway for the gradient, because severe indebtedness is usu-
ally correlated with low income. Moreover, negative health eﬀects of debt might cause
individuals to enter a poverty trap, since bad health is shown to increase the likelihood
of losing the job. In turn, unemployment further tightens the ﬁnancial situation of the
17indebted households.
Therefore, political action should focus more on avoiding overindebtedness. A ﬁrst step
can be the improvement of ﬁnancial literacy, with a special focus on debt literacy (Lusardi
and Tufano, 2009). Ideally, opportunities and risks associated with loan contracts, leasing,
and payments by installments should become part of school curricula. Furthermore, an
adequate funding of debt counselling agencies is necessary to support households aﬀected
by ﬁnancial problems to reschedule debt payments. But this may not be suﬃcient. Before
the ﬁnancial crisis, the volume of unsecured credit strongly increased in the EU as well as
the US, thereby fostering severe indebtedness of private households. There is empirical
evidence that household debt rises in response to extended credit lines (Gross and Souleles,
2002). In the light of our results we strongly recommend further research on the costs and
beneﬁts of household debt and we encourage an intensive and more critical discussion on
the spreading credit culture in Western societies. In contrast, increasing the availability
of healthy food by low-pricing campaigns, as called for in the literature (Münster et al.,
2009), does not seem to be an appropriate measure.
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20Appendix
Table A1. Sample summary statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Health Satisfaction 3.115 2.126 0 10
MCS 50.144 9.772 22.23 98.73
Obesity 0.143 0.350 0 1
Consumer debt/Income 0.032 0.071 0 0.7
Home loans/Income 0.062 0.113 0 0.7
Overindebtedness 0.055 0.228 0 1
Age 41.940 13.331 17 65
Log. equiv. HH income 7.378 0.500 0 11.18
Homeowner 0.512 0.500 0 1
Years of education 11.824 3.334 0 18
Male 0.485 0.500 0 1
Married 0.606 0.489 0 1
Widowed 0.021 0.142 0 1
Divorced 0.078 0.268 0 1
Children in HH 0.366 0.482 0 1
Foreign 0.085 0.279 0 1
West 0.755 0.430 0 1
Unemployed 0.082 0.275 0 1
Out of labor force 0.236 0.425 0 1
Education/Vocational
training
0.070 0.254 0 1
Part time 0.121 0.326 0 1
Blue collar 0.198 0.399 0 1
Selfemployed 0.066 0.248 0 1
Civil servant 0.052 0.221 0 1
Private health insurance 0.138 0.345 0 1
Observations 176,468
Note. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009.
21Table A2. Regression results: Health satisfaction - Debt repayments
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Health Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumer debt/HH-Income 1.692*** 0.290*** 0.216** 0.155**
(0.117) (0.076) (0.103) (0.078)
Housing debt/HH-Income 0.534*** 0.218** 0.256** 0.160**
(0.109) (0.086) (0.110) (0.071)
Age <= 25 -1.762*** 0.156 -0.057 0.073
(0.049) (0.102) (0.155) (0.106)
26 <= Age <= 30 -1.320*** 0.105 -0.060 0.028
(0.047) (0.092) (0.134) (0.096)
31 <= Age <= 35 -1.000*** 0.072 -0.057 0.006
(0.045) (0.082) (0.120) (0.085)
36 <= Age <= 40 -0.708*** 0.041 -0.114 -0.017
(0.044) (0.072) (0.108) (0.075)
41 <= Age <= 45 -0.403*** 0.089 -0.084 0.037
(0.043) (0.062) (0.096) (0.065)
46 <= Age <= 50 -0.176*** 0.102* -0.072 0.052
(0.042) (0.052) (0.085) (0.055)
51 <= Age <= 55 0.055 0.152*** -0.033 0.122***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.074) (0.044)
56 <= Age <= 60 0.133*** 0.158*** 0.028 0.148***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.064) (0.030)
Log. equiv. HH-income -0.414*** -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.107***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.031) (0.020)
Homeowner -0.203*** -0.037 -0.036 -0.024
(0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.025)
Years of education -0.015*** 0.002 0.007 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004)
Male 0.019
(0.020)
Married -0.015 0.004 0.052 0.019
(0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.032)
Widowed -0.020 -0.122 0.007 -0.092
(0.081) (0.097) (0.175) (0.099)
Divorced 0.016 -0.061 -0.048 -0.049
(0.047) (0.044) (0.065) (0.046)
Children in household -0.264*** -0.035* 0.002 -0.034





Unemployed 0.463*** 0.108*** 0.092***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.026)
Out of labor force 0.413*** -0.014 -0.014
(0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
Education/ 0.195*** 0.033 0.019
Vocational training (0.030) (0.024) (0.026)
Part time 0.040 0.006 -0.034 -0.004
(0.027) (0.023) (0.035) (0.024)
Blue collar 0.082*** -0.034* -0.028 -0.035
(0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022)
Selfemployed -0.050 -0.062* -0.011 -0.071*
(0.039) (0.036) (0.057) (0.039)
Civil Servant 0.102** -0.020 -0.108 0.010
(0.048) (0.055) (0.101) (0.058)
Private health insurance -0.148*** -0.041 -0.093** -0.052
(0.033) (0.032) (0.045) (0.035)
Constant 7.170*** 3.396*** 3.226*** 3.709***
(0.180) (0.156) (0.298) (0.167)
Observations 176,468 176,468 78,000 154,647
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.
22Table A3. Regression results: Health satisfaction - Overindebtedness
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Health Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overindebted 0.203*** 0.057** 0.037 0.018
(0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.023)
Age <= 25 -1.712*** 0.144 -0.076 0.074
(0.049) (0.103) (0.156) (0.107)
26 <= Age <= 30 -1.264*** 0.096 -0.072 0.032
(0.047) (0.092) (0.135) (0.096)
31 <= Age <= 35 -0.939*** 0.068 -0.063 0.011
(0.044) (0.082) (0.120) (0.085)
36 <= Age <= 40 -0.649*** 0.040 -0.118 -0.015
(0.044) (0.072) (0.108) (0.075)
41 <= Age <= 45 -0.354*** 0.089 -0.087 0.036
(0.043) (0.062) (0.096) (0.066)
46 <= Age <= 50 -0.143*** 0.099* -0.075 0.051
(0.042) (0.052) (0.085) (0.055)
51 <= Age <= 55 0.078* 0.151*** -0.036 0.118***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.074) (0.044)
56 <= Age <= 60 0.149*** 0.157*** 0.028 0.145***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.064) (0.030)
Log. equiv. HH-income -0.393*** -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.107***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.031) (0.020)
Homeowner -0.162*** -0.004 0.006 -0.009
(0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025)
Years of education -0.017*** 0.002 0.005 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004)
Male 0.024
(0.020)
Married 0.010 0.011 0.061 0.018
(0.032) (0.031) (0.044) (0.032)
Widowed 0.010 -0.108 0.016 -0.099
(0.082) (0.098) (0.177) (0.100)
Divorced 0.048 -0.060 -0.044 -0.058
(0.047) (0.044) (0.065) (0.046)
Children in household -0.259*** -0.034* 0.004 -0.034





Unemployed 0.446*** 0.105*** 0.095***
(0.035) (0.025) (0.026)
Out of labor force 0.391*** -0.017 -0.009
(0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
Education/Vocational training 0.187*** 0.030 0.024
(0.030) (0.024) (0.026)
Part time 0.030 0.004 -0.040 -0.000
(0.027) (0.023) (0.035) (0.024)
Blue collar 0.083*** -0.032 -0.022 -0.035
(0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022)
Selfemployed -0.043 -0.068* -0.015 -0.073*
(0.039) (0.036) (0.058) (0.039)
Civil Servant 0.100** -0.017 -0.111 0.021
(0.049) (0.055) (0.100) (0.058)
Private health insurance -0.148*** -0.044 -0.101** -0.050
(0.033) (0.032) (0.045) (0.035)
Constant 7.062*** 3.447*** 3.334*** 3.712***
(0.183) (0.157) (0.296) (0.167)
Observations 175,730 175,730 77,669 153,628
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.
23Table A4. Regression results: Mental health - Debt repayments
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
MCS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumer debt/Income 7.406*** 1.607** 3.109*** 1.155
(0.823) (0.750) (0.988) (0.757)
Housing debt/Income 2.357*** 2.487*** 3.168*** 1.490**
(0.645) (0.768) (0.987) (0.689)
Age <= 25 1.301*** 2.524*** 2.351* 2.218**
(0.296) (0.878) (1.283) (0.924)
26 <= Age <= 30 2.449*** 2.753*** 2.588** 2.422***
(0.282) (0.785) (1.119) (0.825)
31 <= Age <= 35 3.092*** 2.621*** 2.108** 2.396***
(0.269) (0.695) (0.985) (0.734)
36 <= Age <= 40 3.285*** 2.723*** 2.282*** 2.564***
(0.262) (0.607) (0.864) (0.643)
41 <= Age <= 45 3.141*** 2.537*** 2.206*** 2.469***
(0.252) (0.524) (0.750) (0.555)
46 <= Age <= 50 2.909*** 2.044*** 1.543** 1.947***
(0.246) (0.438) (0.643) (0.465)
51 <= Age <= 55 2.734*** 1.811*** 1.493*** 1.720***
(0.237) (0.343) (0.537) (0.366)
56 <= Age <= 60 1.671*** 1.255*** 1.048** 1.316***
(0.210) (0.232) (0.427) (0.248)
Log. equiv. HH-income -1.890*** -0.648*** -0.298 -0.904***
(0.137) (0.183) (0.268) (0.192)
Homeowner -0.312* -0.560** -0.823*** -0.349
(0.162) (0.232) (0.299) (0.221)
Years of education 0.055*** -0.050 -0.243* -0.101**
(0.018) (0.033) (0.141) (0.041)
Male -1.761***
(0.108)
Married -1.341*** -1.279*** -0.952*** -1.258***
(0.190) (0.262) (0.357) (0.276)
Widowed -0.397 1.836* 2.483 2.245**
(0.478) (0.979) (1.775) (1.054)
Divorced 0.032 -0.953** -0.970* -0.848**
(0.260) (0.383) (0.517) (0.413)
Children in household -0.469*** -0.115 -0.001 -0.161





Unemployed 0.951*** 0.536** 0.441*
(0.218) (0.233) (0.241)
Out of labor force 1.061*** -0.139 -0.155
(0.173) (0.208) (0.222)
Education/ 0.602*** -0.299 -0.644***
Vocational training (0.195) (0.207) (0.223)
Part time -0.017 -0.312 -0.105 -0.358*
(0.165) (0.199) (0.322) (0.212)
Blue collar -0.102 -0.022 -0.136 -0.084
(0.147) (0.188) (0.315) (0.196)
Selfemployed 0.045 -0.071 0.125 -0.192
(0.216) (0.299) (0.499) (0.327)
Civil Servant 0.621** 1.112** 0.312 1.408***
(0.261) (0.476) (0.923) (0.514)
Private health insurance -0.003 0.122 0.340 0.214
(0.188) (0.286) (0.385) (0.317)
Constant 62.756*** 54.448*** 53.855*** 57.351***
(1.040) (1.543) (2.785) (1.641)
Observations 63,954 63,954 28,461 57,422
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.
24Table A5. Regression results: Mental health - Overindebtedness
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
MCS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overindebted 0.972*** 0.673*** 0.615* 0.196
(0.264) (0.234) (0.350) (0.236)
Age <= 25 1.488*** 2.701*** 2.391* 2.151**
(0.296) (0.881) (1.289) (0.926)
26 <= Age <= 30 2.680*** 2.926*** 2.706** 2.393***
(0.281) (0.788) (1.125) (0.829)
31 <= Age <= 35 3.315*** 2.773*** 2.188** 2.402***
(0.266) (0.697) (0.989) (0.737)
36 <= Age <= 40 3.540*** 2.881*** 2.414*** 2.600***
(0.259) (0.609) (0.867) (0.646)
41 <= Age <= 45 3.331*** 2.641*** 2.266*** 2.504***
(0.250) (0.526) (0.752) (0.558)
46 <= Age <= 50 3.060*** 2.137*** 1.623** 1.989***
(0.246) (0.439) (0.645) (0.467)
51 <= Age <= 55 2.812*** 1.866*** 1.535*** 1.764***
(0.237) (0.344) (0.539) (0.369)
56 <= Age <= 60 1.715*** 1.266*** 1.089** 1.348***
(0.210) (0.232) (0.430) (0.249)
Log. equiv. HH-income -1.791*** -0.645*** -0.371 -0.916***
(0.139) (0.180) (0.268) (0.192)
Homeowner -0.162 -0.239 -0.344 -0.172
(0.139) (0.197) (0.259) (0.211)
Years of education 0.049*** -0.054 -0.241* -0.099**
(0.019) (0.033) (0.143) (0.041)
Male -1.746***
(0.108)
Married -1.276*** -1.314*** -0.998*** -1.214***
(0.191) (0.261) (0.357) (0.276)
Widowed -0.387 1.708* 2.038 2.208**
(0.481) (0.985) (1.782) (1.070)
Divorced 0.108 -0.971** -1.086** -0.785*
(0.261) (0.382) (0.515) (0.415)
Children in household -0.438*** -0.113 -0.011 -0.130





Unemployed 0.874*** 0.480** 0.432*
(0.218) (0.233) (0.242)
Out of labor force 0.952*** -0.171 -0.116
(0.173) (0.208) (0.223)
Education/Vocational training 0.577*** -0.319 -0.622***
(0.195) (0.208) (0.222)
Part time -0.070 -0.364* -0.210 -0.340
(0.165) (0.200) (0.325) (0.213)
Blue collar -0.094 -0.027 -0.152 -0.097
(0.147) (0.188) (0.315) (0.196)
Selfemployed 0.039 -0.157 0.068 -0.194
(0.217) (0.301) (0.507) (0.327)
Civil Servant 0.621** 1.066** 0.249 1.381***
(0.263) (0.477) (0.914) (0.514)
Private health insurance 0.001 0.116 0.270 0.182
(0.189) (0.287) (0.388) (0.316)
Constant 62.163*** 54.447*** 54.371*** 57.402***
(1.053) (1.511) (2.781) (1.639)
Observations 63,676 63,676 28,339 57,253
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.
25Table A6. Regression results: Obesity - Debt repayment
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
Obese (1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumer debt/Income 0.148*** -0.003 0.012 -0.030*
(0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017)
Housing debt/Income 0.018 0.004 0.004 0.007
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Age <= 25 -0.150*** 0.036 0.056 0.030
(0.007) (0.022) (0.034) (0.023)
26 <= Age <= 30 -0.097*** 0.034* 0.059* 0.029
(0.008) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021)
31 <= Age <= 35 -0.076*** 0.019 0.055** 0.014
(0.007) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019)
36 <= Age <= 40 -0.061*** 0.014 0.054** 0.009
(0.007) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017)
41 <= Age <= 45 -0.043*** 0.010 0.043** 0.006
(0.007) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015)
46 <= Age <= 50 -0.012* 0.009 0.038** 0.007
(0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
51 <= Age <= 55 0.006 0.006 0.040** 0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
56 <= Age <= 60 0.008 0.007 0.036*** 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Log. equiv. HH-income -0.039*** -0.002 -0.011* -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Homeowner -0.017*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Years of education -0.006*** -0.001** 0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Male 0.019***
(0.003)
Married 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.007 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Widowed 0.088*** -0.022 -0.043 -0.028
(0.011) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027)
Divorced -0.014** 0.022** 0.012 0.021**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Children in household -0.016*** -0.005 0.003 -0.003





Unemployed 0.035*** 0.008 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Out of labor force 0.008* 0.008 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Education/Vocational training -0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Part time -0.026*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Blue collar 0.022*** -0.001 0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Selfemployed -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008)
Civil Servant 0.002 0.003 -0.029 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011)
Private health insurance -0.016*** -0.000 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Constant 0.552*** 0.172*** 0.137** 0.184***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.061) (0.035)
Observations 65,472 65,472 29,029 58,785
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.
26Table A7. Regression results: Obesity - Overindebtedness
Dependent variable: OLS FE FE FE
Full sample Full sample Alw. employed Lagged vars
Obese (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overindebted 0.020*** -0.001 -0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Age <= 25 -0.149*** 0.034 0.053 0.033
(0.007) (0.022) (0.034) (0.024)
26 <= Age <= 30 -0.095*** 0.032 0.057* 0.032
(0.008) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021)
31 <= Age <= 35 -0.074*** 0.018 0.055** 0.017
(0.007) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019)
36 <= Age <= 40 -0.059*** 0.014 0.053** 0.012
(0.007) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017)
41 <= Age <= 45 -0.042*** 0.009 0.042** 0.009
(0.007) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015)
46 <= Age <= 50 -0.011* 0.008 0.038** 0.008
(0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
51 <= Age <= 55 0.005 0.005 0.040** 0.004
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
56 <= Age <= 60 0.006 0.007 0.036*** 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
Log. equiv. HH-income -0.037*** -0.002 -0.013** -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Homeowner -0.017*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Years of education -0.006*** -0.001** 0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Male 0.019***
(0.003)
Married 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.007 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Widowed 0.089*** -0.021 -0.042 -0.024
(0.011) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028)
Divorced -0.012* 0.023** 0.014 0.022**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Children in household -0.016*** -0.004 0.003 -0.003





Unemployed 0.034*** 0.009 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Out of labor force 0.007 0.009 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Education/Vocational training -0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Part time -0.026*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Blue collar 0.022*** -0.000 0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Selfemployed -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
Civil Servant 0.001 0.000 -0.030 -0.000
(0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.012)
Private health insurance -0.015*** 0.001 -0.006 -0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Constant 0.540*** 0.168*** 0.155** 0.125***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.061) (0.036)
Observations 65,161 65,161 28,897 58,595
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1,* *p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: SOEP, 1999-2009. Year dummies
included. Male, Foreign, West dropped in ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions because they are not time-varying.






How would you describe your current health?
Greatly Slightly Not at
all
– –
When you ascend stairs, i.e. go up several ﬂoors
on foot: Does your state of health aﬀect you
greatly, slightly or not at all?
And what about having to cope with other
tiring everyday tasks, i.e. where one has to lift
something heavy or where one requires agility:
Does your state of health aﬀect you greatly,
slightly or not at all?
Please think about the last four weeks. Always Often Some- Almost Never
How often did it occur within this period of
time, ...
times never
  that you felt rushed or pressed for time?
  that you felt run-down and melancholy?
  that you felt relaxed and well-balanced?
  that you used up a lot of energy?
  that you had strong physical pains?
  that due to physical health problems
...you achieved less than you wanted to
at work or in everyday tasks?
...you were limited in some form
at work or in everyday tasks?
  that due to mental health or emotional
problems
...you achieved less than you wanted to
at work or in everyday tasks?
...you carried out your work or everyday tasks
less thoroughly than usual?
  that due to physical or mental health problems
you were limited socially, i.e. in contact with
friends, acquaintances or relatives?
Note. Source: SOEP Individual question form. Available at http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2008/.
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